Levy Wang
Levy Wang
zuyunwan[at]usc[dot]edu | cv
zuyunwan[at]usc[dot]edu | cv
I am a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at the University of Southern California. Before USC, I majored in philosophy at Reed College after my advisor, Paul Hovda, vetoed my decision to pursue an interdisciplinary major in philosophy and psychology.
My dissertation develops a unified theory of epistemic and practical rationality of uncertain emotions such as hope, fear, and anxiety. Additionally, I work on the philosophy of psychiatry and medical ethics. I also have some unfinished business in metaphysics.
In case you are secretly wondering, this is an Emmy-worthy video instruction on pronouncing my first name; this is a video instruction on pronouncing my last name. 'Wang' is the Pinyin romanization of the Chinese character '王.'
Publications
Taking motivating reasons’ deliberative role seriously. Philosophical Studies 182, 725–744 (2025). PDF
Work in progress (*draft available)
Emotions and rationality
A paper on the epistemology and structural rationality of hope* (under review)
I argue that hoping entails suspending judgment. Hope as a form of suspension gives rise to coherence norms governing hope and other familiar states, such as beliefs and intentions.
A paper on the rationality of (false) hope
I argue hoping for an extremely unlikely outcome is not irrational as such. Rather, it is often a failure of resource rationality.
A paper on emotions, lotteries, and knowledge
I explore how a lottery ticket holder's affective states influence our intuitions on what they believe and know.
Philosophy of psychiatry & medical ethics
A distressing consequence of clinically significant distress* (under review)
I argue that the clinical significance criterion in the current DSM leads to false positive diagnoses of mental disorders. Disorders targeting identity traits of social minorities are especially vulnerable to false positive diagnoses.
A paper on the etiology problem as a kind of false positives problem
I introduce the etiology problem, a new source of the false positives problem in psychiatry, where "symptoms" cause clinically significant distress and impairment without any underlying dysfunction.
A paper on the harm condition for illnesses
A popular view of illness is that an illness must cause harm to the individual. I explore different causal relations between an illness and harm.
Metaphysics
Explaining numerical distinctness*
I argue the metaphysical explanation for numerical distinctness is that distinct objects have different property/properties. I show that this explanation works for highly indiscernible objects, such as co-locating, qualitatively identical objects.